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**1962/10/19**

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EXCLUSION OF POL IN INITIAL BLOCKADE

**DENY**

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**EXCISE**

(25)

Estimates are that Cuba has 75 days' normal supply of POL on hand which, by strict rationing, could be stretched to 3 to 6 months. POL is supplied about evenly by Soviet bloc and non-bloc ships. The argument for including POL in the indirect blockade is that it is punishment for and directly pointed at the survival of the Castro regime, there is no problem of inspection, and, by being applied evenly between Soviet bloc and non-bloc vessels, giving Sov to les. complaint. Against this is that it is not directly to weapons' capability on which we go to action, it is a move and thus may force a more significant response from the Soviets before there has been a chance for dialogue. It would deprive one of the simplest and steps to subsequent escalation of the blockade. (See enclosed page for further details)

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IS/FPC/CDR *WJH* Date. *12-18-92*

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SOME POSSIBLE SUBSEQUENT COURSES OF ACTION AND COUNTER-ACTION

1. Imposition of the blockade itself does not of course dispose of the problem of offensive weapons already in Cuba. It only embarks us on what is likely to be a long course of action and counter-action between the Soviets and Cubans on the one side and ourselves and our allies on the other. It is impossible to foresee with any certainty what some of the more likely sequences of events may be and how they may be used to accomplish our ultimate aim of eliminating these offensive weapons from Cuba.
2. The Soviets would certainly initiate a full propaganda and political attack in all fora. They would emphasize the underdog situation of Cuba, justness of Castro's cause, threats by U. S. to his survival, defensiveness and legitimacy of weapons for his defense, etc.
3. In the United Nations they would seek to get our action declared illegal, get the neutrals to propose resolutions calling for a lifting of the blockade coupled with elimination of all foreign bases.
4. They would bring pressure on all neutrals to commit themselves to the Soviet side of the issues raised. They would call for "progressive forces" to protest and take political or subversive action against governments not supporting their side.
5. From the broad standpoint, the Soviet Union would be at a serious military disadvantage in attempting to break the blockade by

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military means in the Cuban area. They could threaten dire action, possibly by the missiles located in Cuba, against the United States, if the blockade were not lifted and Cuban sovereignty not fully respected. In any event, the Soviets would seek to have us "fire the first shot" against a Soviet merchant vessel and/or warship in the Cuban area in order to provide a better basis for strong Soviet counter-action in another area. We must face the fact that we may therefore be required to "fire the first shot".

6. This could lay a basis for action in Berlin. One option might be slow action, following a Peace Treaty, with maximum pressure on our allies. Another option could be prompt denial of U. S. military access, justifying their firing on our planes in the Berlin corridor or convoys by reference to our prior action in enforcing the Cuban blockade.

7. They could call for high level discussions of a proposal for the elimination of all foreign bases.

8. Cuban motives will be mixed. On the one hand, if the blockade includes only offensive weapons it will have no economic effects on Cuba, and Castro's self-interest would appear to dictate that he not take actions which would provide a base for us to raise the level of the blockade or take military action directly against Cuba. This factor would militate against his attacking Guantanamo or other actions such as attacking the U. S. blockade force or taking reprisals against

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U. S. merchant vessels and/or ports, in the hope that Soviet counter-actions elsewhere would force us to lift the blockade. He will of course do his maximum to obtain Soviet threats to deter the U. S. from further action.

9. Barring unforeseen and unlikely favorable events in Cuba or in the attitude of Castro, we could within the limits imposed by Soviet-Cuban counter-actions, seek to direct our course toward providing as quickly as possible a basis for direct military action against Cuba, or toward a course of negotiation in which it is likely that we would have to be prepared to pay a price elsewhere to obtain removal of the offensive weapons in Cuba. These courses are of course not mutually exclusive and the choice is by no means only up to us.

10. The former course would require that we take advantage of the opportunities the Soviets and Cubans give us to step up the blockade and to take military actions directed against Cuba without regard to whatever threats the Soviets may make.

11. The course of negotiation can also not be predicted or planned with any high degree of certitude. However, a possible line of action and counter-action could be:

a. Soviet blockade of Berlin or of U. S. forces in Berlin.

— b. Full U. S. blockade of Cuba.

c. Imposition

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c. Imposition of NATO economic embargo against the Soviet Union.

d. A summit conference or other negotiations in which agreement might be reached on the basis of U. S. withdrawal from Guantanamo and lifting of NATO economic embargo against the Soviet Union in exchange for Soviet withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba and lifting of Berlin blockade. However, this may be very difficult and there is no certainty it could be accomplished without further concessions on our part. Such concessions might relate to the Jupiters in Turkey and an agreement on the installation of long-range missiles at other locations near the Soviet border. (This would present little difficulty except from the political standpoint with respect to Turkey.)

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HOW NUCLEAR THREAT CAN BE ELIMINATED UNDER BLOCKADE PLAN

There are only four ways by which we can contemplate the elimination of the missiles and nuclear aircraft if we go the blockade route.

[The first is, hopefully, to bring about the fall of Castro as a consequence of the economic and political pressures of the blockade. 6/10/5]

A second -- and related possibility -- is to support military and guerrilla action against Castro that might lead to his downfall.]

The third is by a progressive escalation of actions leading from the use of force in implementing the blockade, [which does not directly involve killings Cubans, to direct military action which does.] 6/10/5

Finally, there is the possibility of a political deal with Khrushchev -- or more remotely -- a political deal with Castro that would involve his deserting Khrushchev. 6/10/5

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1. Economic and Political Pressures of Blockade Leading to the Fall of Castro

The offensive build-up coupled with the blockade provide new elements that can be utilized to stimulate the build-up of anti-Castro feelings in Cuba. ]

a. Desertion by Soviet Union

The first question is, of course, whether the Soviets will, or will not, attempt to run the blockade. If, presumably after some preliminary skirmishes, they accept the blockade -- and particularly if the blockade includes POL -- there is likely to be a sense of dismay and a feeling of desertion within the ranks of the Castro supporters.

b. Weight of the United States Decision

[ The effect of a feeling of Soviet desertion will be intensified if it is accompanied by the sense that the United States has made an irrevocable decision to use increasing efforts to bring about the fall of Castro. ] So long as it appeared that the Cuban people had a viable option between an

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alliance with the Bloc and making peace with the United States, they could have some hope that they could continue to defy America. But that hope would be denied them if the Soviet Union permitted Cuba to be isolated by the blockade.

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c. Resentment at Soviet Presumption and Use of Cuban Territory

The fact that the Communist forces are taking over areas of the country and excluding all Cubans can hardly help but be a cause for resentment on the part, not only of the Cuban people, but even of the Cuban military. The theme that Cuba is now an occupied country can be effectively used for propaganda purposes.

d. Increased Economic Pressure on Population

If -- but only if -- the blockade includes -- either initially or soon thereafter -- the interdiction of the importation

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importation of POL, we can expect its economic consequences to be felt in a reasonably short time. It is estimated that Cuba has seventh-five days normal supply of POL on hand -- which, by ~~strict~~ rationing, could be stretched to ~~three to~~ six months. The imposition of rationing would, however, give a sense of impending catastrophe. Moreover, the military would certainly insist on establishing priorities for ~~their~~ their own purposes. This kind of struggle always leads to internal dissension.

e. Government in Exile

We should give further thought to moving toward the creation of a Cuban Government in

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2. Development and Support of Military Action Against Castro

With the heightened pressure on the Castro Regime and the Cuban people, brought about by the blockade and its consequences, the intensification of guerrilla activities should become easier -- since there would be a greater indication that the United States would be the probable ultimate victor.

General Escalation

The effort to foresee a transition from blockade to direct military action against Cuba raises a major question: Can the United States risk military action against Cuba

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with conventional weapons once the missile

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sites have become operational? Probably the answer must be negative. While the chances of a missile being fired as a result of the initiation of conventional military action, the consequences, if one by any chance were fired, under military action an unacceptable risk under these circumstances.

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A different situation would arise, of course, if we could be sure the missiles were not, and could not be, armed. Different answers, would therefore be possible if the problem is considered on alternative assumptions:

- a. Assumption that our intelligence establishes that there are no warheads presently in Cuba, that we can have full confidence in this intelligence, and that the blockade can be fully effective to prevent the introduction of warheads.

Under these circumstances the progression from blockade to direct military action again becomes relatively easy. ~~XXXX~~ We could safely utilize any legitimate provocation to initiate either an air strike directed against the missile installations and nuclear carrying aircraft or an invasion.

- b. Assumption that there are warheads presently in Cuba, or that we cannot be sure that there are not, or that we cannot be sure that the

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blockade can effectively interdict their introduction.

Under these circumstances the progression to military action is subject to the serious disability which Secretary McNamara has pointed out -- the risk that a missile might be fired in the head of conventional attack.

This risk might be minimized by an invasion. Of course, if the invasion were preceded by an air strike against missiles and aircraft, the danger would persist. But if the invasion were first concentrated on the governmental complex in Havana -- leaving the missile sites free from direct air attack -- the danger would be minimized. The problem of the nuclear-delivery aircraft could be destroyed on a first strike.

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In view of these conclusions we should then consider a second question: Whether we could prevent the progress toward putting the missiles in operational condition by surveillance, threat and if necessary, military action.

Action of this sort would involve warning both the Cubans and the Russians that we would take military action at the first evidence of any progress toward putting the missiles in operational shape. This has many disadvantages. The element of surprise would be wholly eliminated and a premium would be placed on camouflage. There could thus be no assurance that some missiles would not become operational. Meanwhile, any strike at a Soviet missile would have all the disadvantages of the larger strike plan, since it would involve offensive action which would almost certainly result in the death of a number of Russians.

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4. Elimination of Missiles by Diplomatic Arrangement

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COMBINED SCENARIO

1. Objective

a. Prompt elimination of offensive nuclear capability from Cuba without use of "Pearl Harbor" type action. Avoidance of any prolonged negotiation on this matter.

b. In the absence of acceptance by C.L. of (a) and of international inspection to avoid continued non-compliance, early elimination of Castro regime.

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2. Action - Presidential speech - Monday evening.

(To maintain timetable it is necessary for the President to return to Washington early Sunday to make decisions during the day).

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a. Blockade

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- a. Blockade including POL effective 24 hours  
after announcement.
  - b. Demand for immediate cessation of work and initiation  
substantial low-level surveillance to enforce.
  - c. Call OAS meeting to demand removal offensive  
weapons from Cuba under international inspection.  
(US makes clear to Latins this only way to avoid  
US action).
  - d. Call Congress into special session to ratify  
objective and the demand for cessation of work in  
Cuba. Session to be held Wednesday.
  - e. Make clear that missile attack from Cuba will  
initiate general war.
3. Subsequent action

- a. Appropriate military alerts, including SAC from

Monday

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- Monday evening on. Initiation of preparations for all possible actions against Cuba including invasion.
- b. OAS meets Tuesday, votes Wednesday.
  - c. UN informed of danger Tuesday.
  - d. Low level surveillance Tuesday.
  - e. Release low level pictures to public as soon as possible, hopefully Wednesday, PM.
  - f. If construction continues on IL-28's or on missile sites, or substantial interference with surveillance, air strike on Friday on Saturday.
  - g. If Soviets threaten to attack US, reply that we are continuing on course and decision re general war is theirs.

h. Refuse

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- h. Refuse to negotiate cessation of work in Cuba and immediate initiation international (OAS) inspection.
- i. Announce willingness to negotiate all other reductions in tensions including reduction US nuclear capacity in Turkey (i.e. Jupiter missiles.)
- j. Be prepared to continue course in ~~face~~ face of criticism from at least some NATO allies.

4. Expectation

- a. Air strike by end of week unless Cuba has substantially accepted US demands, i.e. work stopped inspection accepted, reasonable prospect of prompt dismantlement of existing offensive missile sites.
- b. If air strike necessary, invasion and occupation

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[Occupation of Cuba to follow as soon as possible.]

5. Major Weakness (which we should be prepared to accept)

Loss of tactical military surprise. Increased danger  
of use of nuclear weapons from Cuba.

6. Major Unresolved Question

- a. Advisability of new proclamation of national  
emergency.

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